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1 Introduction
In every negotiation with a deadline, one of the negotiating parties has to accept an offer to avoid a break
off. Therefore, it is important for every negotiator to employ a mechanism to decide under which conditions
to accept. However, designing a proper acceptance condition is a difﬁcult task: accepting too late may result
in the break off of a negotiation, while accepting too early may result in suboptimal agreements.
Despite its importance, the theory of acceptance conditions in negotiation has not yet received much
attention. Our goal is to classify current approaches and to compare acceptance conditions in an experi-
mental setting. Motivated by the challenges of bilateral negotiations between automated agents and by the
resultsandinsightsoftheAutomatedNegotiatingAgentsCompetition(ANAC)[1], weclassifyandcompare
state-of-the-art generic acceptance conditions. We focus on decoupled acceptance conditions: i.e., generic
acceptance conditions that can be used in conjunction with an arbitrary bidding strategy.
Our contribution is fourfold:
1. We give an overview and provide a categorization of current decoupled acceptance conditions.
2. We introduce a formal negotiation model that supports the use of arbitrary acceptance conditions.
3. We compare a selection of current generic acceptance conditions and evaluate them in an experimental
setting.
4. We propose new acceptance conditions and test them against established acceptance conditions, using
varying types of bidding techniques.
2 Experiments
In order to experimentally test the efﬁcacy of an acceptance condition, we equipped a set of agents with an
acceptance condition, and measured its result against other agents by averaging the total accumulated utility
over all trials on various negotiation domains. We have surveyed existing negotiation agents to examine
the acceptance criteria that they employ. A selection of the acceptance conditions that we tested is listed in
Table 1. The built-in mechanism is the acceptance condition that was originally present in the agents.
For our experimental setup we employed GENIUS (General Environment for Negotiation with Intelligent
multi-purpose Usage Simulation) [2]. This environment, which is also used in ANAC, helps to facilitate the
design and evaluation of automated negotiators’ strategies.
We use the negotiation tactics that were submitted to ANAC 2010 [1]. ANAC is a negotiation com-
petition aiming to facilitate and coordinate the research into proﬁcient negotiation strategies for bilateral
multi-issue negotiation.
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1Acceptance Condition Description
ACconst() Accept when the opponents bid is better than .
ACnext Accept when the opponents bid is better than our upcoming bid.
ACtime(T) Accept when time T has passed.
ACcombi(MAX) Accept when the current offer is the best in a previous time window.
Table 1: Acceptance conditions employed by various agents.
Acceptance Agreement % Average utility Total
Condition of agreements avg
ACcombi(MAX) 99% 0.679 0.675
Built-in mechanism 82% 0.768 0.627
ACtime(0:99) 99% 0.622 0.618
ACnext 72% 0.787 0.567
ACconst(0:8) 38% 0.851 0.324
ACconst(0:9) 26% 0.935 0.239
Table 2: Utility scores of agents equipped with an acceptance condition
3 Results and Conclusion
Designing an effective acceptance condition is challenging because of the acceptance dilemma: better offers
may arrive in the future, but waiting for too long can result in a break off of the negotiation, which is un-
desirable for both parties, especially in the setting of one-shot negotiations. A selection of the experimental
results are summarized in Table 2, for which the following holds:
(The acceptance dilemma)
Total average utility = Agreement percentage

Average utility of agreements.
This formula captures the essence of the acceptance dilemma: accepting bad to mediocre offers yields more
agreements of relatively low utility. While accepting only the best offers produces less agreements, but of
higher utility. Acceptance conditions will have to ﬁnd a balance between both goals.
ACtime(T), with T close to 1 is a sensible criterion to avoid a break off at all cost. However, the resulting
deal can be anything, so the resulting agreement utility is very low. ACconst() is not very advantageous to
use, as the choice of the constant  is highly domain-dependent. In very cooperative domains, ACconst()
will accept an offer that can be relatively bad, i.e. it could have done much better. On the other hand, in
highly competitive domains, it may simply ‘ask for too much’ and may rarely obtain an agreement.
The standard condition ACnext is often used by negotiating agents. However, from our results, it is
apparent that it does not always yield optimal agreements. We have devised more sophisticated acceptance
conditions by combining existing ones such as ACnext and ACtime(T) into new ones; one example being
ACcombi(MAX). These combinations outperformed the other conditions we have tested.
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